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An Alternative Approach to Malware Research
C.J. May
Department of Computer Science
University of Northern Iowa
programs. A graduate student at Cornell University,
Robert Morris, wrote a program later called the Morris
Abstract --- Current antivirus programs have design
Worm that ended up bringing down almost the entire
flaws that allow malware to bypass detection. Despite
internet in just 24 hours [3]. This was before the world
this, malicious parties are usually the ones to find and
wide web, so the chaos was not quite as wide-spread as it
exploit these flaws before they can be fixed.
would be today. Nevertheless, there was estimated to be
Therefore, a more proactive approach to malware
millions of dollars in damages. The incident caused the
research should become the new standard. To that
whole world to understand how vulnerable computers
end, a new programming language will be designed
had become. Even today, preventing the infection of
and created that sheds light on a couple of design
malicious software (malware) largely remains a game of
flaws in current antivirus models. Fundamentally,
cat-and-mouse.
antivirus programs have trouble detecting
Since the Morris Worm brought down the whole
interpreted languages. In addition, it is suspected that
internet, people have better understood the power of
antivirus programs are unable to detect an unknown
malware. Malicious hackers, hacktivists, and even nation
programming language that is injected into another
states now develop malware for the purpose of
file thus creating polyglot code. The Jaws
manipulating computers for financial or political gain.
programming language has been designed to exploit
For example, in 2010 the United States and Israel
both of these weaknesses, and its implementation
launched a cyber attack called Stuxnet that destroyed
proves that such a language can exist.
Iran’s nuclear facilities in an effort to stymie their efforts
Index Terms --- artificial intelligence (AI), instruction in developing nuclear weapons [5]. That attack was also
modification parameter (IMP)
a type of worm, and it was able to be spread by USB
drives. The most interesting part of the Stuxnet attack
was that it proved that malware can not only affect cyber
I. Purpose
space; malware can impact physical space as well.
The purpose of this research is to prove that
Other than worms, there have been many
even the most advanced antivirus programs have design different types of malware that have emerged [10].
gaps in detecting emerging threats, and that a more Adware delivers mass ads to infected computers.
proactive approach to malware research must become the Ransomware holds a system’s files captive via
new standard. The proactive approach to be tested in the encryption and only returns them in exchange for
hypothesis should be thought of as a kind of vulnerability payment. Spyware records and exfiltrates a user’s
research for antivirus programs. The exploited activity without them knowing. Trojan Horses disguise
vulnerability in this research is purported to shed light on themselves as a normal program but do malicious things
an unintended design flaw in antivirus software.
in the background. There are other kinds of malware as
well, and all have to do with manipulating infected
II. Literature/Source Review
computers to do the attacker’s bidding.
As the prevalence of malware has increased, so
To understand vulnerability research and why it have measures to detect and prevent malware. Antivirus
is done, we must first explore the topics of malware and programs are an example of software designed to combat
antivirus software. In November of 1988, the world had malware. Antivirus programs scan the files on a
a wake up call about the potential severity of malicious computer and evaluate whether or not they are malicious.
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If a file is found to be malicious, it is deleted or
quarantined. Of the most popular antivirus programs [9],
there are two main categories of antivirus software:
signature-based and artificial-intelligence-based.
Signature-based antivirus has been around for a
long time because it has proven to be mostly effective [8].
Signature-based antivirus programs keep definitions, or
“hashes,” of known malware and periodically scan a
computer’s file system looking for a matching hash [6].
If a file matches known malware, the antivirus program
deletes or quarantines the file. Signature-based antivirus
excels at finding the most common types of malware that
are currently wreaking havoc in the wild.
There are several weaknesses to the signaturebased model, however [6]. New strains of malware go
completely undetected since they are not yet in the
antivirus’s definition list. In addition, the sheer volume
of unique malware can make a definition list quickly
grow too big in size, and most signature-based antivirus
have to leave out many definitions for this reason.
Polymorphic, or self-changing, malware is also very
good at evading detection because it is able to change its
signature every time it replicates. Although signaturebased antivirus excels at stopping known malware,
advances made by cyber criminals in malware design
have been slowly making it less effective.
The weaknesses of signature-based antivirus
have been mostly addressed in a newer, emerging type of
antivirus based on behavior. At the front of the behaviorbased antivirus industry is AI (artificial intelligence). AIbased antivirus [4] doesn’t require large databases of
malware hashes to look out for. Instead, the software
contains a neural network that has been trained to
positively identify files that look like malware. This not
only removes the need for large definition files, but it also
allows the antivirus software to identify new and
polymorphic threats that somewhat resemble known
malware.
Unfortunately, there are still some caveats to the
current AI-based antivirus models. Some AI-based
antivirus programs scan compiled binary files for strings,
and use those strings to derive a malware score [2]. One
vulnerability found in this model is to inject the malware
with “happy” strings that would make the file look less
suspicious. This vulnerability has been exploited by
researchers against Cylance Protect, the leading vendor
in the AI antivirus field [2]. Cylance fixed the
vulnerability before it could be exploited in the wild
because it was responsibly disclosed by the researchers.

Another way to evade AI-based antivirus is to
write malicious code in a language that is not compiled
to binary [7]. The difference between a compiled
language and one that runs on a virtual machine should
first be explained. At a high level, a computer is a
complex machine that only interprets 1’s and 0’s
(binary), and it uses those signals to perform calculations
and tasks. When programmers write code, it has to be
translated into binary before it can be run. A program that
performs this translation is called a compiler. A compiler
is a complex program. First, it inputs a text file written in
a language, or code, defined for the compiler. Then, after
performing lots of operations, the compiler outputs an
executable program in the form of a binary file. A virtual
machine is similar to a compiler, but it does not output
the translated binary to an executable file. Instead, once
a virtual machine interprets an instruction from the input,
it executes it on behalf of the code.
Languages that run on virtual machines such as
Java are an example of this. These types of programming
languages are interpreted and immediately executed
rather than compiled to binary and saved to an executable
file which makes them harder or impossible for an
antivirus program to detect [7]. Unpublished research
done by my colleague Tony Nizzi concluded that the
engine for any kind of antivirus software would need to
include some form of the virtual machine that the code
runs on in order to be able to detect it through static
analysis. This would greatly increase the size of the
antivirus program for each virtual machine included. In
addition, less popular or new virtual machines would
almost assuredly not be included.

III. Hypothesis
Both models of antivirus software have proven
to be effective against the majority of malware; however,
what would happen if a new kind of threat emerged that
was designed specifically to evade both AI and signaturebased antivirus? It would be better if this kind of threat
were accounted for before it may be unleashed by a
malicious party. The hypothesis for this thesis is that this
kind of proactive approach to malware research would
greatly benefit the antivirus industry. As shown by the
Cylance Protect case, there are weaknesses in even the
most advanced antivirus models that can be fixed [2]. To
test the hypothesis, research must be done to design and
develop a proof of concept malicious program that is able
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to evade even the most advanced antivirus software.
Then, mitigation techniques will be offered to show that
improvements to current anti-malware models can be
made.

IV. Methodology
The proof of concept program for this research
must be capable of exploiting the weaknesses of both
models of antivirus. Therefore, a virtual machine for a
completely new language must be designed. For the
proof of concept in this research, a new programming
language called Jaws has been designed that runs on a
custom virtual machine. Jaws is an esoteric, interpreted
programming language that is based on another, called
Whitespace [11], with added functionality. Jaws is an
imperative, stack based language in which the only
lexical tokens are the characters Space, Tab, and New
Line. These characters, being invisible, are commonly
called “whitespace”. The name Jaws is an acronym (Just
Another WhiteSpace), but the word itself was also
intended to hold meaning because the code, being
invisible to the human eye, is like a threat hidden beneath
the surface. The reason for this is that Jaws was
specifically designed to enable it to be used in polyglot
code.
Polyglot code is a computer program or script
contained in a single file, yet written in a valid form of
multiple programming languages. Jaws interprets only
whitespace characters while ignoring all other characters.
Because of this, it is possible to easily create polyglot
code by injecting Jaws into many types of files. This
includes, but is not limited to: other programming
languages, markup languages, text files, and image files.
The next section of this document goes into detail about
how Jaws code would be injected into various types of
files without breaking either one’s functionality.
The Jaws virtual machine has been designed to
ignore any whitespace characters that are deemed to be
not part of the Jaws program. This is made possible with
the definition of a header and a footer that designate
which areas of a file should be interpreted as Jaws code.
In the lexer component of the Jaws virtual machine,
character interpretation is stalled until the Jaws header
has been scanned from the file. After the header has been
scanned, any whitespace characters are then interpreted
as Jaws code. If the footer is scanned after any complete
statement, the lexer will again stall interpretation until

another header has been read. The signal for end-ofprogram is interpreted differently than the footer, which
allows Jaws code to be broken up and scattered
throughout different parts of a file.
Programming and markup languages that are
not whitespace controlled such as Javascript, C/C++,
Perl, and HTML/CSS can be injected with Jaws code
very easily. These kinds of languages usually require an
arbitrary number of whitespace characters between
tokens, but do not have strict requirements on the type,
amount, or arrangement. The only requirement for this
type of code injection is that every instance of a
whitespace character in the original code is replaced with
a part of the Jaws code. This requirement is to prevent
whitespace characters not part of the Jaws code from
being interpreted by the Jaws virtual machine while it is
interpreting.
Jaws can be injected into Python code, but the
process is slightly more complex than it is for most other
programming languages. Because spacing and
indentation matter in Python code, Python requires a
fixed pattern of whitespace characters within its code. It
cannot be modified to replace spaces or tabs with an
arbitrary amount of whitespace characters, nor can it
prepend/append whitespace characters to a line of code.
Whitespace can, however, be found in arbitrary
arrangements on their own lines within Python code. This
means that lines of Jaws code can be placed before or
after lines of Python code without interfering with
Python’s interpreter. In addition, because of the
implementation of the Jaws header and footer, the
required whitespace in the Python code can be ignored by
the Jaws lexer.
Files that consist of plain text in the form of
unicode or ascii characters can be injected in the same
way as non-whitespace-controlled programming
languages. The only difference with plain text files is that
you can technically place the whitespace characters from
the Jaws code anywhere without breaking the
'functionality' of the text file. The requirement of
removing all previously existing whitespace characters
still exists, but they technically do not need to be replaced
in the same location unless you want to retain the
groupings of characters that form 'words'.
Jaws code can also be injected into image files
because of the Jaws header and footer. Many image file
types can be injected with another file, completely hiding
the second file in the process. This is because image files
such as JPEG, PNG, and GIF ignore all data following
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their footer. Anything after the image footer is ignored by
programs opening the file. Therefore, any type of file or
language that is interpreted starting at a designated
header can be placed below an image footer in the same
file. Because the Jaws virtual machine can begin
interpretation at a designated header, it can ignore any
'whitespace' found in the image binary and then begin
interpretation at any time after. In fact, Jaws code can
also be injected into an image file that has already been
combined with another file such as a zip archive.
The ability of Jaws code to be injected into other
files is the key trait that allows it to achieve a high level
of obfuscation. Jaws can truly hide in plain sight. It is
expected that automated static analysis techniques will be
completely thrown off by the original file’s type or
language. Even humans performing manual analysis
should be unlikely to catch the hidden Jaws code because
it is invisible to the human eye. Additionally, one of the
first things that is done when doing manual analysis on
malicious source code is to clean up the whitespace and
make it more readable. In the case of a polyglot file
injected with Jaws code, this would only erase the
evidence. This design choice in the proof of concept is to

prove that even the most advanced malware detection
techniques have serious gaps.
Another design choice in the proof of concept
was to write the virtual machine in the C programming
language so it can run on any architecture that C compiles
to. Since C can be compiled to almost any architecture,
the Jaws virtual machine can be run almost anywhere as
well. This includes computers with x64 architecture
(most laptops, desktops, and servers), ARM architecture
(embedded systems and mobile phones), and even web
browsers via WebAssembly. This opens up a lot of attack
vectors that will have to be explored and evaluated
separately, since malware prevention software looks
different on all of these targets.

V. Implementation
The Jaws programming language had a lot of
thought put into the design in order to meet the
requirements set in the hypothesis. The final language
specification for Jaws that is implemented in the Jaws
virtual machine is shown in Figure 1 below:

Figure 1: Jaws Language Specification

Jaws Language Specification:
Lexical Tokens
The only lexical tokens in Jaws are Space (ASCII 3210), Tab, (ASCII 910), and Line Feed (ASCII 1010). The choice to
use line feed only and not carriage return was to avoid DOS/Unix conversion problems.

Starting/Stopping Interpretation
Jaws code will only interpret whitespace tokens in the section of the file between the Jaws Header and Footer. There
can be any number of such sections in the same file. This gives the Jaws interpreter the ability to start and stop
interpretation any number of times until the End-of-Program statement is reached. The tokens that make up the Header
and the Footer are identical, but the End-of-Program instruction is unique and signals the end of the program.
[LF][Tab][Space]

Header/Footer

[LF][LF][LF]

End-of-Program

Instruction Set

5

Each instruction consists of two parts: The Instruction Modification Parameter (IMP) and the command. The IMP
describes what type of operation the command is. The command is interpreted based on which IMP preceded it, and
it is then executed accordingly. The IMPs and their commands are listed below.

Instruction Modification Parameter (IMP)
The IMP is the first part of a Jaws instruction. The command following it will be interpreted differently depending on
which IMP is selected. The chart below illustrates each IMP:
[Space][Space]

Stack Manipulation

[Space][Tab]

Arithmetic

[Tab][Tab]

Heap Access

[LF][Space]

Flow Control

[Tab][LF]

I/O Action

[Tab][Space]

I/O Control

Commands
The commands for each IMP are organized together. The character(s) for the command follow directly after the IMP's
characters with no delimiter. Some commands require a parameter as a part of the instruction. In these cases, the
parameter will immediately follow the command in the form of a binary number. [Space] represents 0, [Tab] represents
1, and a [LF] signals the end of the parameter. Read more on parameters below the commands.
Stack Manipulation (IMP: [Space][Space])
Stack manipulation is the most commonly used instruction type. There are four stack instructions.
[Space] (Parameter: Data)

Push a literal onto the stack

[LF][Space]

Duplicate the top item on the stack

[LF][Tab]

Swap the top two items on the stack

[LF][LF]

Discard the top item on the stack

Arithmetic (IMP: [Space][Tab])
Arithmetic commands operate on the top two items on the stack, and replace them with the result of the operation.
The first item to be popped is considered to be to the left of the operator.
[Space][Space]

Addition

[Space][Tab]

Subtraction

[Space][LF]

Multiplication

[Tab][Space]

Integer Division
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[Tab][Tab]

Modulo

Heap Access (IMP: [Tab][Tab])
Heap access commands look at the stack to find the address of items to be stored or retrieved. To store an item, push
the address then the value and run the store command. To retrieve an item, push the address and run the retrieve
command, which will replace the address at the top of the stack.
[Space]

Store

[Tab]

Retrieve

Flow Control (IMP: [LF][Space])
Flow control operations are also very common. Labels mark the targets of conditional and unconditional jumps as
well as subroutines. Flow control operations allow high-level logic like loops, if-statements, and functions to be
implemented.
[Space][Space] (Parameter: Label) Mark a location in the program
[Space][Tab] (Parameter: Label)

Call a subroutine

[Space][LF] (Parameter: Label)

Jump unconditionally to a label

[Tab][Space] (Parameter: Label)

Jump to a label if the top of the stack is zero

[Tab][Tab] (Parameter: Label)

Jump to a label if the top of the stack is negative

[Tab][LF]

End a subroutine and jump back to caller

I/O Action (IMP: [Tab][LF])
We need to be able to interact with the user and the disk. There are I/O instructions for reading and writing numbers
and individual characters.
[Space][Space]

Output the character at the top of the stack

[Space][Tab]

Output the number at the top of the stack

[Tab][Space]

Read a character and place it on the top of the stack

[Tab][Tab]

Read a number and place it on the top of the stack

I/O Control (IMP [Tab][Space])
We need to be able to read and write from the disk or to communicate over a network. To do that, we will change the
I/O stream from standard in/out to a file.
[Space][Space]

Change I/O stream to a File -- get mode character and then
file path from the stack

[Space][Tab] (Parameters: IP, Port)

Change I/O stream to TCP connection at IP, Port

[Tab][Space]

Change I/O to standard in/out
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NOTES: File mode is one of 3 characters: r, w, or a. Each file mode's functionality is equivalent to C language's r+,
w+, and a+ modes. File path is between ‘{ }’ brackets and popped characters are arranged left-to-right (push characters
onto the stack backwards so they are popped in order)
Command Parameters
Each parameter type is fixed-length. A binary data literal pushed onto the stack is either 32 bits (int) or 8 bits (char).
At runtime, the type of data pushed onto the stack depends on the size of the parameter. Type checking is done before
the data reaches the stack. where the data involved is explicitly declared by the language. Label parameters are 16 bits
long, leaving room for 65,536 different labels. Network connection parameters are 48 bits long -- 32 bits to specify
the IP address, followed by 16 bits to specify the port number.
End of Figure 1
Once the language was designed, the interpreter
had to be written. I have decided to only explain the code
at a high level rather than include the source in this thesis
for two reasons. First, the source code contains many
thousands of lines, and it would be too verbose to include
in full. The second reason is due to the nature of the Jaws
programming language. It may be ethically irresponsible
to open-source the virtual machine before the threat it
potentially poses is proven to be accounted for in
antivirus software.
As mentioned in the methodology, the Jaws
virtual machine was written in the C programming
language. To aid in speeding up the project’s
development timeline, Flex and Bison [11] were used to
generate C code for the parser. Flex and Bison are
programs that generate a lexer and a parser (respectively)
through the definition of a language’s tokens and
grammar. Once the language specification above was
translated into valid Flex and Bison files, they generated
the lexer and parser parts of the Jaws virtual machine in
the form of C code.
Flex and Bison files are divided up into three
sections. The first section is the control section. The
control section includes things like C headers that will get
placed in the generated file, as well as options for Flex or
Bison when generating the lexer and parser. The Jaws

virtual machine includes options for importing C libraries
and keeping track of line numbers. The second section is
specific to Flex or Bison. More on Jaws’ implementation
of the second section is found in the following
paragraphs. The last section contains C code to be copied
verbatim to the generated parser. In the Jaws virtual
machine’s source code, this section is for defining the
‘main’ function of the interpreter.
The first code that was written for the Jaws
virtual machine was the Flex file that is used to generate
the Jaws lexer. The Jaws Flex file only defines three
tokens (Space, Tab, and Linefeed). Everything else is
ignored as specified by a line containing the wildcard
token for all other characters. All the lexer generated by
Flex does is capture these three tokens and pass them on
to the parser generated by Bison. The Jaws Flex file is
relatively short, because there are only three tokens for
the language and they are each only one character.
Next, the Jaws Bison file was written for the
generation of the parser. A Bison file’s second section
consists of the formal grammar of the language with the
tokens from the Flex lexer as terminals. Bison generates
the parser from that formal grammar. The formal
grammar for the Jaws programming language is defined
in Figure 2 below:

Figure 2: Jaws Formal Grammar

jaws (start symbol)

⇒

<bodies> <last_body>
| <last_body>

bodies

⇒

<bodies> <body>
| <body>

body

⇒

<header> <instructions> <footer>

last_body

⇒

<header> <instructions> <end_program>
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header

⇒

<extra_lines> LF TAB SPACE
| LF TAB SPACE

footer

⇒

LF TAB SPACE

end_program

⇒

<end_instruction> <extra_lines>
| <end_instruction>

end_instruction

⇒

LF LF LF

extra_lines

⇒

<extra_lines> <extra_line>
| <extra_line>

extra_line

⇒

SPACE
| TAB
| LF

instructions

⇒

<instructions> <instruction>
| <instruction>

instruction

⇒

<stack_manipulation>
| <arithmetic>
| <heap_access>
| <flow_control>
| <io_action>
| <io_control>

stack_manipulation

⇒

SPACE SPACE <stack_command>

arithmetic

⇒

SPACE TAB <arith_command>

heap_access

⇒

TAB TAB <heap_command>

flow_control

⇒

LF SPACE <flow_command>

io_action

⇒

TAB LF <io_action_command>

io_control

⇒

TAB SPACE <io_control_command>

stack_command

⇒

<stack_push>
| <stack_duplicate>
| <stack_swap>
| <stack_discard>

arith_command

⇒

<addition>
| <subtraction>
| <multiplication>
| <integer_division>
| <modulo>

heap_command

⇒

<heap_store>
| <heap_retrieve>

flow_command

⇒

<new_label>
| <call_subroutine>
| <uncond_jump>
| <jump_if_zero>
| <jump_if_neg>
| <end_subroutine>

io_action_command

⇒

<output_char>
| <output_int>
| <read_char>
| <read_int>
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io_control_command

⇒

<stream_file>
| <stream_net>
| <stream_stdio>

stack_push

⇒

SPACE <number>

stack_duplicate

⇒

LF SPACE

stack_swap

⇒

LF TAB

stack_discard

⇒

LF LF

addition

⇒

SPACE SPACE

subtraction

⇒

SPACE TAB

multiplication

⇒

SPACE LF

integer_division

⇒

TAB SPACE

modulo

⇒

TAB TAB

heap_store

⇒

SPACE

heap_retrieve

⇒

TAB

new_label

⇒

SPACE SPACE <label>

call_subroutine

⇒

SPACE TAB <label>

uncond_jump

⇒

SPACE LF <label>

jump_if_zero

⇒

TAB SPACE <label>

jump_if_neg

⇒

TAB TAB <label>

end_subroutine

⇒

TAB LF

output_char

⇒

SPACE SPACE

output_int

⇒

SPACE TAB

read_char

⇒

TAB SPACE

read_int

⇒

TAB TAB

stream_file

⇒

SPACE SPACE

stream_net

⇒

SPACE TAB <ip> <port>

stream_stdio

⇒

TAB SPACE

number

⇒

<bits> LF

label

⇒

<bits> LF

bits

⇒

<bits> <bit>
| <bit>

ip

⇒

<octet> <octet> <octet> <octet>

octet

⇒

<bit> <bit> <bit> <bit> <bit> <bit> <bit> <bit>

port

⇒

<octet> <octet> LF

bit

⇒

SPACE
| TAB
End of Figure 2
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Next, the capability for Jaws code to be injected
into whitespace-controlled programming languages like
Python was added to the Jaws virtual machine. As
mentioned earlier, in the case of a whitespace-controlled
language like Python you can have arbitrary whitespace
on lines separate from Python code. However, the
whitespace characters in the lines of Python would break
the functionality of the Jaws lines. For cases like that, a
feature was added to the Jaws virtual machine that
enables it to start and stop interpretation of whitespace
characters using header and footer statements. Once the
rest of the formal grammar was parsing correctly, the
header and footer statement functionality was added into
the grammar in the Jaws Bison File.
The final part of the Jaws virtual machine that
had to be written was the runtime system that would
execute the code. The Jaws runtime system is
implemented in pure C code. Having only written a single
traditional compiler before this project, creating a
runtime system for the Jaws virtual machine was
uncharted territory for me. I initially had some
preconceived notions of how to do it that I quickly
figured out wouldn’t work. After brainstorming and
consulting with my research advisor, Dr. Eugene
Wallingford, I decided the best plan of action was to
create multiple data structures to represent the program.
There would be a data structure for a stack, a heap, an
instruction, and a program (which contains an array of
instructions). At the recommendation of Dr. Wallingford,
I also created a data structure for a jump table that could

help the runtime system execute jumps. Various
functions to interact with each of these data structures
were written. Lastly, semantic actions were added to the
Bison file’s formal grammar to construct some of these
structures during the parsing of Jaws code.
Next, functions were created to represent each
type of instruction defined in the language specification.
A pointer to the corresponding instruction function is
included in the instruction data structure once it is
identified and created. As the program data structure
iterates through the program, it simply keeps track of an
instruction pointer and calls the instructions’ functions as
they come. Flow control operations may modify the
instruction pointer, allowing for instructions to be called
more than once.
Lastly, a lot of error-checking code was added
to both the parser and the runtime system. It is important
for a compiler or interpreter to provide informative error
messages. Jaws error messages display the type of error,
exactly why it happened, which instruction type caused
the error, and what line of code the error occurred on.
Once error-checking was done being added, the Jaws
virtual machine was finished.
The complete Jaws virtual machine can indeed
run ‘invisible code’ that is completely composed of
Spaces, Tabs, and Linefeeds. Below, Figure 3 shows the
traditional ‘Hello World’ program on the left written in
Jaws (with spaces and tabs highlighted for visual aid).
The output of the program is displayed on the right.
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Figure 3: Hello World Jaws Program

As mentioned earlier, it was also necessary to
create a visible language that can compile into Jaws code.
This enables anyone to write and debug code much more
quickly when developing Jaws programs. The name of
the visible Jaws code is “Fin”. The Fin language has a
traditional compiler that outputs Jaws code rather than
executing a runtime system. For the Fin compiler, Flex
and Bison were used again to generate the lexer and
parser. That allowed me to reuse a lot of the formal
grammar I defined in Jaws’s Bison file.
The Flex file for the Fin compiler was quite a bit
more work than it was for Jaws. Jaws only has three
tokens, but a readable version of Fin called for a separate
token for each instruction. For example, ‘add’, ‘sub’,
‘mult’, and ‘div’ are all individual tokens, rather than
each one being made of the same three characters.
Another thing that added complexity to the Fin
lexer was the addition of literals as tokens. In Jaws,
instruction parameters such as numbers and IP addresses
were simply defined in binary, with 1 being a Tab and 0
being a Space. However, in order to write code more
easily, functionality was added to Fin to be able to write
things like “2048”, “C”, and “127.0.0.1:22” as

parameters. To do this, regular expressions were defined
for each literal. Other than the number of tokens and the
regular expressions for the literals, there wasn’t anything
else that needed to be modified in the Fin Flex file.
A lot of the existing Jaws grammar was able to
be copied to the Fin Bison file due to the two languages
having the same syntactic structure. The tokens coming
in from the lexer had to be redefined, and their
corresponding terminal symbols had to be replaced in the
grammar. Other than that, though, the formal grammar
remained mostly the same. Once all the tokens were
parsing correctly, code generation was the final part of
the Fin compiler.
The code generation for the Fin compiler ended
up being fairly simple. First, a Jaws output file to write to
was declared in the main function of the parser. Then
semantic actions were placed after each terminal symbol
in the Bison grammar. Each semantic action writes the
corresponding Jaws invisible character combination to
the output file. Once that was complete, some polish was
added to the Fin compiler. Command line arguments for
specifying the output file and suppressing visible
annotation of the Jaws code were added as options.

12

Additionally, makefiles and man pages were added to
both the Fin compiler and the Jaws virtual machine to aid
in ease of distribution.

VI. Expected Findings & Conclusion
Unfortunately, the goal of testing the hypothesis
was not able to be completed before the submission of
this thesis due to the time constraints that one semester
affords and the amount of time it takes to write an
interpreter and compiler. I was not able to do enough
testing of malware written in Jaws code to be able to
present any findings. I was, however, able to prove that a
polyglot, interpreted programming language can exist.
The Jaws programming language is designed to exploit
every weakness of current antivirus models. The next
steps in this research are to develop malware using the
Jaws programming language and to run various tests
against antivirus software to see if malicious code written
in Jaws is able to be detected. Once proper testing is able
to occur, it is expected that the proof of concept malware
is able to evade all leading antivirus programs by
exploiting an unintended weakness in the overall design.
In addition to the expected findings, it is
important that design changes can be offered for current
antivirus models that would mitigate the threat developed

in the proof of concept. Currently, the design change for
antivirus software that would be suggested is to add
functionality to detect unknown interpreters. This would
enable the antivirus to flag programs as suspicious.
However, because an interpreter is not inherently
malicious, this would still require laborious human
analysis and is an inelegant solution in my opinion. A
better solution may be quite complex. Therefore,
additional research may also be needed in that case to
ensure that the threat is adequately mitigated.
If the expected findings hold true, a
programming language like Jaws would effectively
render all antivirus software useless. If existing or future
malware were to be rewritten in Jaws, they would be able
to run without detection on any computer. The
implications of this would be extrememly detrimental to
the security of all computers. Private research like this is
important in taking the advantage over malicious cyber
adversaries because it allows us to stay ahead of the bad
guys instead of cleaning up a mess when they discover
something like Jaws. This alternative approach to
malware research shows that anti-malware models can be
improved through responsible development and
disclosure of new types of malware and evasion
techniques.
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